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Henry James’s Suspended Situations
O M R I M O S E S
Concordia University
I think he [Henry James] has about the keenest sense of Situation of any
novelist.
(T. S. ELIOT to ELEANOR HINKLEY, April 1, 1918)
If one wanted to characterize the oddity of Henry James’s way of staging
characters in his late long novels, one could do worse than to note how lit-
tle we are told of the characters’ motives or intentions—especially when it
comes to their most imposing aims and plans. Ordinarily with a psycho-
logical novel, one does not need to read an express purpose in order to
infer one. Narrative reticence merely obliges one to conjecture from a
repertoire of probabilities and then to choose the likeliest, pending fur-
ther confirmation. James’s interpretive protocols are somewhat different.
It is not that The Golden Bowl (1904), for instance, fails to invite inferences
about a character’s motives or intentions. But one gets an impression that
those motives are tied, to an unusual degree, to the moment-by-moment
unfolding of a situation rather than to some desire or fact hidden behind
it. Maggie Verver and Charlotte Stant do not allow themselves any desire
that is not contingent on the situation that emerges before them. Because
their feelings are adapting to circumstances that are never entirely fixed,
they would seem to flicker before us without giving their possessors the
smooth, rounded outline of consistent beings. James’s characters dis-
cover themselves in their own conversations, which trace the contours of
the situation that gives substance to them.
To say that James is a ‘‘situational’’ novelist is already to remark upon
something basic that distinguishes him from other novelists of his time.
Each of his characters is so profoundly relational that she or he cannot be
bound to any independent—which is to say, preestablished and recur-
ring—form of being. The contention that James launches situationally
defined characters, I am well aware, goes contrary to the models of person-
I would like to thank Charles Altieri, Kaja Silverman, Mary Esteve, Justus Nieland, and
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stages of the present essay’s construction.
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hood that hold high currency in our culture. We assume that people derive
their psychological consistency from a set of dominant traits that, whether
visible or not, provides them with an identity that cannot easily be sur-
mounted or swept away. The complexion of their desires and tendencies
of thought would, so long as we presume their regularity, sooner or later
be made to reveal linkages to the formative events of their life, or else to
their inherited traits. One might call these substantialist models of charac-
ter. However much one model varies from another in its details, they all
presuppose that people make large-scale adjustments to their situation that
are regulated by intractable preferences and fixed patterns that emerge
from outside the situation at hand and transcend it. James’s characters, by
contrast, obtain their consistency from their continuous engagement with
succeeding social environments with which they are obliged to interact.
Their reactions have real repercussions for themselves and others around
them, and the powers of perception and willpower that they wield shape
them in meaningful ways. And yet while they continually change, they
remain in an unbroken relation with their past instantiations.
I do not want to say, exactly, that James sweeps away all ‘‘interior’’ con-
tent from his characters—all desires or consistent intentions. But whatever
elements of character he fixes from the start are neither a sufficient basis
for his fiction nor a satisfactory representation of character itself. There
are ample examples of Jamesian characters whose desires remain constant
and unquestioned even as circumstances change. Maggie’s love of Prince
Amerigo, unaltered throughout The Golden Bowl (1904), is one. But such
desires are merely preliminary. They do not ‘‘signify’’ of themselves and
only come to mean something important about the personages who har-
bor them when placed in a dynamic context. While James grants his char-
acters their donne´e, he does not invite readers to interpret or excavate the
deep causes underlying their actions. Patterns of causes are—we are left to
gather—taken for granted, and therefore uninteresting, apart from the
situation in which those determinants are made use of or tested.
In James, characters come alive only at the point when, in response to
a situation, a vital hesitation suspends or transforms an initial intention
or, indeed, fails to. To get a sense of his abandonment of cause and fixity
in favor of vital adaptability, one need only consider the double-dealing
plot design of The Wings of the Dove (1902), wherein Kate Croy concocts a
plan to marry off Merton Densher, her flame, to a wealthy heiress whom
she knows to be mortally ill. As James says in one of his letters, the under-
standing between the two is ‘‘in its explicitness simply the subject of the
book.’’1 James’s deeper interest lies in how characters dispose themselves
1. Henry James to Mary Humphry Ward, September 23, 1902, in Henry James: A Life in
Letters, ed. Philip Horne (New York: Viking, 1999), 372.
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in relation to their desires the moment another subjectivity enters the
equation—in this case, Milly Theale, with all her needs and vulnerabil-
ities. Kate’s persisting in her intention is a reflection, it would seem, of a
wondrously opportunistic will that crystallizes in the midst of her experi-
ence. Her intentions are activated and modified by their placement in a
complex situation in order for them to endure across time. Though quite
definite, they are a preamble to an improvised response.
More often than not in James’s last novels, intentions and motives
seem belated or halfhearted, expressing only a tendency to act in a cer-
tain way or to pursue a specific direction of thought; they are not fully
formed purposes. James is, on the whole, an unpsychological psycholo-
gist in that he refuses to make the psychological reduction that translates
impulses into preordained rationales—that projects onto tendencies a
retrospective finality or that reads the future with the mistaken neatness
of the past. For reasons clarified below, I draw here on the psychological
fallacy that James’s contemporary, the philosopher Henri Bergson, asso-
ciated with analytical models that conflate tendencies, or in his terms
e´lan vital, with purposes. He suggests that we are apt to confuse the end
with the road itself, but ‘‘the road has been created pari passu with the act
of traveling over it, being nothing but the direction of this act itself. At ev-
ery instant, then, evolution must admit of a psychological interpretation
which is, for our point of view, the best interpretation; but this explana-
tion has neither value nor even significance except retrospectively.’’2 For
Bergson, interpretations that seek a fixed order in all things suit certain
practical human needs, but only by distorting the actual nature of
unfolding events.
Critics who have understood James as doing away with substantialist
conceptions of character have often interpreted his intricately wrought
formal experiments as a way of transcending the limitations imposed by
the structure of character itself, tending to regard his formal resolutions
as substitutes for fully engaging human problems. In what follows, I ques-
tion this move to depose character from being the ultimate seat of reck-
oning for negotiations of conflict in James.
My aim in this essay is to examine some of the objections that James
raises to prevailing moral and psychological ideals of consistency. I sug-
gest that rather than simply doing away with character, he dissolves the
standard of consistency traditionally applied to moral entities and re-
fashions their modes of unity and individuation in ways that are unex-
pected but ultimately psychologically and ethically compelling. We will
begin, then, by asking what the imagined personages in James’s complex
novels tell us about what it means to be a person. One key element of
2. Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Dover, 1998), 51.
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concern will be his characters’ fluid identifications, emotive capacities,
and ad hoc impulses, which allow them to adjust to their circumstances
rather than be moored to a dominating past. It would seem that his pro-
tagonists withstand any impulse to fortify or retrench psychic life and
thus decline to insulate themselves from others.
To be sure, it is hard to get around the feeling that James confers upon
characters a malleability we do not normally expect of people. Their con-
sistency seems strangely ‘‘superficial’’—prescribed by details of the moment
and not by the deeper personal identity typically evoked in the nineteenth-
century novel.3 The superficiality I am alluding to does not refer to a trivial
quality of person but to a responsiveness that James’s characters show to the
very surface of social life and its webs of signification. The interest held by
these complexities largely displaces the reader’s need to probe the inner
machinery of their personality (throughout I am using the term ‘‘personal-
ity’’ to denote the structure underlying self ). It is difficult to locate an abid-
ing quality of moral purpose connecting their behavior to principles spon-
sored and strengthened by the self ’s previously established integrity.
In order to account for this phenomenon, we need a psychological
model that makes allowances for the self-inventive capacity of people
while still pegging selfhood to nontrivial forms of material and social
constraint. In the latter half of my argument, I enlist the aid of certain
psychological accounts developed during the period by the intellectual
practitioners of ‘‘vitalism.’’ Critics have underestimated the relevance of
this discourse to James’s understanding of character, despite the central
role that his own brother, William James, had in its development. This
essay will consider Henri Bergson and William James by turns, both of
whom emphasize an action-oriented account of agency while discarding
models that presume that there is some set identity at the core of self.
Each figure welcomed and supported the other’s work—as many of their
letters attest—but the linkage has not been an object of much critical
attention, nor have scholars established the central contribution that
William James’s brother, Henry, makes to vitalistic paradigms of charac-
ter.4 The Golden Bowl is my prevailing case; its four principal protagonists
3. What I am calling superficial is a specifically psychological quality of character and
not a tendency to foreground the objects of the concrete material world—the subject of
Thomas Otten’s A Superficial Reading of Henry James: Preoccupations with the Material World
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2006).
4. William James writes to Bergson that Pragmatism, the book he is sending him, is
‘‘jejune and inconsiderable’’ but so ‘‘congruent with parts of your system, fits so well into in-
terstices thereof, that you will easily understand why I am so enthusiastic. I feel that at bot-
tom we are fighting the same fight’’ (William James to Henri Bergson, June 13, 1907, in The
Correspondence of William James, ed. Ignas K. Skrupskelis and Elizabeth M. Berkeley, 12 vols.
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demonstrate a capacity to fashion compelling new identities by putting
their established attitudes on hold and readjusting their relations to one
another. These personages take their signals not from the past but from
the virtual future, that is, from the opportunities that they discern or cre-
ate in the situation cast before them.
By invoking Jamesian vitalism rather than pragmatism, I wish to suggest
more than that ‘‘the ‘self ’ is merely another transitional agency, a progres-
sive unfolding that is at the same time an ongoing reflection on that unfold-
ing.’’ Though Jonathan Levin’s incisive quasi-Spinozan formulation here
emphasizes Henry James’s interest in process, in the ‘‘drama of transition,’’
over any substantive conclusion afforded us as readers, it says little about
why transitions in experience are meaningful or what aspects of agency they
liberate.5 In other words, Levin misses an opportunity to place these transi-
tions within a larger account of grounds for ethical comportment in James’s
novels. Like other critics whom we will examine more directly, principally
Leo Bersani and Sharon Cameron, he would rather not situate this unfold-
ing perception in any specific locus of consciousness. Instead, I foreground
James’s commitments to realism in order to explore the link between his
psychological conception of character and his vision of ethical life.
For the last sixty years, the tendency to approach character as a fictive
element in a structure has been central in attempts to reflect on charac-
terization. Long after narratologists started referring to characters as
‘‘actants’’ and ‘‘existents,’’ classifiable by the range of predictable roles,
types, and actions they represent, literary critics have emphasized formal
or structural analysis.6 By contrast, I suggest that Henry James’s fascination
with psychic variability can contribute to our conception of what a per-
son is. For this reason, one might endeavor to repsychologize James’s
characters, treat them in a manner that is different in kind from merely
asking how they mimic or predict real people’s behavior within a certain
[Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2002], 11:377). Bergson responds after read-
ing Pragmatism: ‘‘Pour ma part, je n’ai jamais mieux saisi l’affinite´ qui existe entre nos deux
me´thodes de penser’’ (For my part, I never understood better the affinity that exists between
our two methods of thinking) (Henri Bergson to William James, January 27, 1908, ibid.,
11:531, my translation).
5. Jonathan Levin, The Poetics of Transition: Emerson, Pragmatism, and American Literary
Modernism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 118, 117.
6. As Thomas Petruso argues, these methodologies display elaborate formalisms that
displace issues of characterization, not as L. C. Knights did by favoring ‘‘literary’’ concerns
with metaphor and imagery, but by focusing on the ‘‘tensions’’ and ‘‘anxieties’’ of the text
itself rather than the people within it (Thomas Petruso, Life Made Real [Ann Arbor: Univer-
sity of Michigan Press, 1991], 3). See also L. C. Knights, ‘‘How Many Children Hath Lady
Macbeth?’’ in Further Explorations (London: Chatto & Windus, 1965), 1–39.
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range of experience, how they flesh out thematic and formal issues, or
how they fit with symbolic typologies.7
Recently, Alex Woloch has attempted to chart a sophisticated middle
pathway between structuralist views of character as codes or allegorical
features within a ‘‘distributional matrix’’ and an earlier character criti-
cism that focused on individual psychologies irrespective of placement
within the narrative. His ‘‘synthetic’’ theory of literary character prefers
to speak about character-spaces and character-systems—that is to say,
about how fictive individuals get positioned within a narrative frame and
how their positionings intersect to create social configurations.8 These
social configurations suggest communities of individuals vying for ac-
knowledgment within a social space. In his view, the depth or complexity
of a character is rendered by the quantity of narrative attention granted
to it or by the number of minor characters that are sacrificed on that
character’s behalf. I would argue, though, that he attends insufficiently
to the specific individuating qualities that emerge as these ‘‘implied peo-
ple’’ respond to one another. While characterization cannot happen in
the absence of rigorous formal arrangements, the interpretive dictates
also need to emerge out of something other than narrative imperatives.
In focusing on characters’ makeshift and extemporized acts, we will con-
sider modes of characterization that cannot be classified or explicated
solely or even primarily in terms of plot function and structural tension.
In The Golden Bowl and The Ambassadors (1903), James calls particularly
acute attention to the incipient features of his protagonists’ activities—
the way these characters come to focus on a thing before they know exactly
what they are focusing on, or why. Dramatizing their leaps of thought,
James suggests a mind so overwhelmed by the possibilities it perceives all
around it that it has to remain perpetually alive to those possibilities.
Strether’s principal problem in The Ambassadors, as he comes to see it, is
that he has to keep pace with the change he discovers in Chad: ‘‘What it
came to was that with an absolutely new quantity to deal with one simply
couldn’t know [how to appraise him]. The new quantity was represented
by the fact that Chad had been made over.’’ For this reason, ‘‘Strether
7. Judith Ryan, for example, turns characters in Henry James’s Golden Bowl into allegori-
cal stand-ins for vying psychological discourses rather than considering their individuating
qualities as they emerge in a specific situation, the real starting point for a Jamesian mod-
ernism (Judith Ryan, The Vanishing Subject: Early Psychology and Literary Modernism [University
of Chicago Press, 1991]). She is, however, one of a very few critics to explore in any detail
the relation between late nineteenth-century trends in empirical psychology and modernist
literary production. She focuses on such things as modernists’ presentations of conscious-
ness and sensory perception as they relate to various empirical and positivist models devel-
oped by Franz Brentano, Wilhelm Wundt, William James, and Ernst Mach.
8. Alex Woloch, The One vs. the Many: Minor Characters and the Space of the Protagonist in the
Novel (Princeton University Press, 2003), 13, 19.
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didn’t, as he talked, absolutely follow himself; he only knew he was clutch-
ing his thread and that he held it from moment to moment a little tighter.’’9
Strether may try to pursue his appointed task, to retrieve Chad from the
clutches of Europe, but the somewhat desperate effort he makes is beset
with difficulties. Strether is like Maggie, Densher, and Maisie: each of their
situations is constantly in movement and requires responses of them before
they have a chance to process unfolding events.
James does not withhold from us information that such characters
have about their own actions—certainly not in the same way, say, that a
mystery novel or a piece of detective fiction would. These characters them-
selves do not have premeditated intentions, or if they do, their ensuing
aims are vague, tentative, and contingent upon events. The prototypical
Jamesian character is not simply looking for the best means or instruments
for realizing his or her intentions. He or she has in fact to modify desire
itself—and the intentions that result from it—in order to be able take
advantage of all the forces that enable action. For James, as for Nietzsche,
the iron force of will consists not in arbitrarily triumphing over a situation
but, rather, in aligning oneself with its contingencies and using that hori-
zon of expectation as a basis both for acting and, to some degree, for want-
ing. Pursuing a wish for something outside the limits of any situation is
idle if not dangerous, inasmuch as it stokes a fantasy about voluntaristic
agency that leads to a benighted form of detachment. Desire is more labile
for James’s characters—not infinitely flexible, but open enough to allow
characters to tune their feelings in accord with their perception of events,
to play them out in conversation, and to strengthen some elements at the
expense of others.
While I would argue for the validity of these claims across Henry
James’s late works, they emerge with particular salience in The Golden
Bowl . To the degree that there is a plot, it conforms to the terms of a gar-
den-variety adultery romance. The novel opens with Prince Amerigo, an
impoverished Italian nobleman on the cusp of marrying Maggie Verver,
the daughter of a very wealthy American businessman. Charlotte Stant, a
school friend of Maggie’s who has had an intimate relationship with the
prince unknown to Maggie herself, arrives in London for the wedding
with intentions that are not entirely clear. Her relationship with Amerigo
was called off prior to the latter’s acquaintance with Maggie; Charlotte
herself is penniless, and despite her fervid feelings for the prince, finan-
cial matters make the liaison impracticable. Charlotte arranges to meet
her former lover with the ostensible objective of buying a present for her
friend, his soon-to-be wife, but also to spend one last afternoon with him
before his wedding. Maggie is to be told nothing of the outing. Time
9. Henry James, The Ambassadors (New York: Penguin, 1986), 165, 164.
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passes. Maggie gives birth to a son, and Charlotte returns to London. Re-
maining poor, and at the behest of various benefactors, Charlotte ends
her silent wretchedness by marrying Maggie’s father. With this prelimi-
nary framework of dual entanglement established, the novel subsequently
concerns itself with the making and unmaking of the affair that sparks up
between Charlotte and Amerigo.
The affair becomes the occasion for James to explore an intricate
situation that invites characters to consider numerous avenues of possible
response. Each action on the part of his characters is, in James’s hands,
weighted and compounded with proliferating extensions of meaning, and
therefore any inferences on our part as to why they do what they do from
one moment to the next are hardly self-evident. Indeed, each strand of
the situation is dependent on reciprocated understandings that have yet
to firm up. Of course, the novel is in some sense ‘‘about’’ an affair in the
making, with all the requisite instances of intentional lying and masking
that such a plot demands. Yet critics have a tendency to exaggerate and
even misconstrue the sense of conscious purpose in Charlotte and Ameri-
go’s elaborate subterfuge. One might legitimately ask whether Charlotte
marries Adam Verver to get close to the prince, but the answer is not
straightforward. What Charlotte is ‘‘really thinking’’ when she wrestles with
the idea of marrying the millionaire is impossible to discern—for her and
for us—outside of her reaction to individual circumstances.
Such characterological suspension is on view in one of the novel’s
understated prick points, when Adam Verver sets about to learn why Char-
lotte so tenaciously postpones her acceptance of the marriage proposal he
has advanced. Verver, building upon, elaborating, and perhaps just a
touch justifying his proposition, tells her, when faced with certain as yet
unclear resistances, that he anticipates Maggie’s pleasure with the engage-
ment. Maggie, he thinks, believes her father will in general benefit from
being married, even going so far as to put forward that ‘‘it’s her idea —!’’:
This enunciation of motive, the next moment, however, sounded to
[Adam Verver] perhaps a bit thin, so that he gave it another touch.
‘‘That is if it’s my idea [for marriage]. I happen, you see, to like my idea.’’
‘‘Well, it’s beautiful and wonderful. But isn’t it, possibly,’’ Charlotte
asked, ‘‘not quite enough to marry me for?’’
‘‘Why so, my dear child? Isn’t a man’s idea usually what he does
marry for?’’
Charlotte, considering, looked as if this might perhaps be a large
question, or at all events something of an extension of one they were
immediately concerned with.10
10. Henry James, The Golden Bowl (New York: Wordsworth, 1995), 133, hereafter cited
parenthetically as GB.
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In this stunning scene, Charlotte is navigating the stresses and values of
different implications that the proposal has for her (the extenuating cir-
cumstances, large and small, that concern her). She appears to hedge at
this moment. Is she worried about Amerigo’s reaction to the news of his
former lover’s engagement with his father-in-law—his sense of the com-
plications or temptations? Is she simply afraid of a snub from him at a
moment when she expects to be able to cinch her grip around him? Or is
it that her enduring attachment to the prince makes her balk at this new
opportunity? On the other hand, how convincing is this proposal, an in-
dication of future commitment on the part of her admirer, which places
such emphasis on his daughter’s feelings rather than his own? James’s
point, I submit, is not to have the reader settle on one or several answers
to the questions but to see the situation as one susceptible to different
forms of anchoring, different ways of suiting and arranging implications,
thus as itself open, in wait of future relations that have not yet formed or
hardened. One inevitably asks the questions, but only to track the possi-
bilities suspended there before one. Charlotte seems not to have fin-
ished deciding at this moment where exactly to place her hope—with
the Amerigo or with Adam Verver. After receiving a telegram from Amer-
igo, it is true that Charlotte quickly consents to the proposal. Even here,
though, she seems as much in search of intentions as readers are. The tele-
gram, ambiguous as it is, only manages to keep open the possibilities that
she needs to sustain in order to pledge herself; or rather, it relieves her
of worries that might have been too much for her already ambivalent
position.
Charlotte is not a completely cynical actor, even if one may be tempted
retrospectively to construe her as such. To be sure, when we next see her,
she is pursuing the prince with evident confidence. But two years have
passed, and certain possibilities have presumably ebbed and evaporated:
her husband’s hinted-at impotence has squelched any prospect of sexual
intimacy with him and, along with it, the chance of having children. She
quickly neutralizes Fanny, who poses one of the chief obstacles to her
designs, turning her innuendo about liberties taken and proprieties bro-
ken into flat acknowledgment of the case at hand—thus giving her no
recourse for protest or threat. All the same, Charlotte has, as Fanny later
remarks, ‘‘so remarkably much’’ to say for herself about the conditions of
her marital bargain (GB, 165). She is not simply plowing her way through
to the desired conclusion. She cares a great deal about how she pursues
the affair. Indeed, she preserves a lucid accounting of all the people to
whom she is still accountable, as well as all the relations that have brought
her to her present crisis.
Even in those moments when Charlotte’s intentions look obvious, they
are still only preliminary. What gets foregrounded is a certain wait-and-
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see attitude on her part. She may go about with the obvious intention of
securing a more confidential proximity to Amerigo and, in the mean-
time, rid herself of Fanny, but she has yet to discover how she can fit her-
self, her desires, her sense of her position, into a brokered compromise.
As part 3 opens, she is quite literally suspended ‘‘half way up the ‘monu-
mental’ staircase’’ at an ambassador’s party, flourishing herself in such a
manner as to present—to Fanny, to Fanny’s husband, to herself—what her
fluid situation, ‘‘imperfectly articulate,’’ presents for her (GB, 146).
James’s readers have sometimes been befuddled by the odd mixture
of overt motives and temporizing evasions expressed by characters in his
later fiction. Van Wyck Brooks early on complained of their mystifying
behavior, which ‘‘bears no just relation to the motives that are imputed
to them. . . . Magnificent pretensions, petty performances!—the fruits of
an irresponsible imagination, or a deranged sense of values, of a mind
working in a void, uncorrected by any clear consciousness of human
causes and effects.’’11 I propose, though, that relatively secure motives
can coexist with a specific kind of irresolution. First of all, James shows
that desires are multiple and sometimes contradictory. Situations help
prioritize those desires, but they also elicit impulses that are unforesee-
able and that lead in improbable directions—or that solicit action with-
out demanding a complete map of possible ends. Sometimes what
James’s characters find uncertain are not the specific attitudes they may
hold or the intentions they harbor but the way to put them to work, parti-
cularly when other people are at issue. His interest, then, is in the sorts of
cases where attitudes and values somehow jar with the particular situa-
tions they are called upon to referee—and where the characters who har-
bor them are changed by the experience they run into. The little shocks
dramatized in James’s novels are nothing but friction points, moments
when characters are forced to adjust to their situations, and situations, in
turn, test the capacities of characters to alter and rework them.
S U P E R F I C I A L C H A R A C T E R S , C E N T E R E D S E L V E S :
T H E C A S E O F G E O R G E E L I O T
In order to appreciate fully the importance of James’s conceptual reno-
vation of character, it may be instructive to look at important realist mod-
els of character in circulation at successive stages of his career as a writer.
I consider, first, the case of George Eliot, whose precedent James admired
but distanced himself from; and second, that of Joseph Conrad, whose
situations and impulse-driven characters often draw critical comparisons
with James’s own, to somewhat misleading purpose. Eliot, like Conrad,
11. Van Wyck Brooks, The Pilgrimage of Henry James (New York: Dutton, 1925), 133–34.
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promotes critical paradigms that search for the secret unmovable centers
guiding and motivating behavior. One may gauge the distinctiveness of
Jamesian modernism by the novel interpretive frames of reference he
brings to bear on character analysis and, as I will eventually argue, by the
‘‘suspended’’ situations he presents for readers’ contemplation. These situ-
ations force one to navigate an unprecedented, because highly particu-
lar, constellation of relations that yields no stable interpretive framework
on which to judge it.
Consider the following moment from Middlemarch (1871–72), where
Eliot ratchets up the central conflict in the book, between the ingenuous
Dorothea, whose morally uncalculating nature leads her to grandiose
marital misreckoning, and the brittle, stony Mr. Casaubon:
We are all of us born in moral stupidity, taking the world as an udder to feed
our supreme selves: Dorothea had early begun to emerge from that
stupidity, but yet it had been easier to her to imagine how she would devote
herself to Mr. Casaubon, and become wise and strong in his strength and
wisdom, than to conceive with that distinctness which is no longer reflection
but feeling—an idea wrought back to the directness of sense, like the
solidity of objects—that he had an equivalent centre of self, whence the
lights and shadows must always fall with a certain difference.12
The ‘‘certain difference’’ of which Eliot speaks is the unequivocal divi-
sion that separates one person from another, and it presumes a certain
persistency with which each goes on being who he or she is. Characters
in her terms enjoy solidity. They are capable of casting shadows and are
subject, emotionally and physically, to the laws pertaining to things that
endure in their own separate nature. What is more, Eliot’s protagonists
are ranked as separate—and equivalent—centers, but what makes them
a center is not a point of view or a specific responsibility all their own,
formed by virtue of their present position in a social configuration. Rather,
they are centers on the basis of their abstract status as moral beings, with
obligations accruing to them accordingly, or else because they are subject
to the constraints of their appointed nature. Dorothea’s bright expectancy,
Eliot implies, cannot long withstand the erosions of an incompatible alli-
ance, which reveal to her only the massive outline of her husband’s shadowy
difference from her.
Of course, the passage I cite is erected around a metaphor, and its indi-
rectness as well as narrative location leaves open the possibility that Casau-
bon is not quite as solid and self-sufficient as Dorothea here believes. Mid-
dlemarch is, after all, ultimately about the interconnections that subtly and
12. George Eliot, Middlemarch (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 208.
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invisibly constitute social life. The metaphor goes a fair way to undermin-
ing itself by suggesting that elements of character are assessed not by them-
selves but only analogically, relationally (one person set against another)—
and would be hard to understand outside of the linkages and contrasts that
seem to reveal them in social life. Dorothea’s knowledge either of herself
or of her husband is not possible except as knowledge within a relation-
ship, discovered by an act of feeling or inference.
Neil Hertz’s reading of this passage in George Eliot’s Pulse casts off the
implication that this moment of awakening is the novel’s final say. He sug-
gests that Dorothea’s emergence from moral ‘‘stupidity’’ is unavoidably in-
complete. As he says, ‘‘To be born in moral stupidity is to be born imagina-
tive; and it is against the inertia of this mode of imaginative activity, the
narcissistic dwelling on and in an image, that the moral imagination has
both to define itself and defend itself.’’13 His argument seems to be that,
for Eliot, moral life requires that one recognize people in their differ-
ences, but at the same time one cannot be allowed to remain wholly de-
tached from them, or one risks blindness to the very principles that draw
one into a human community with others. Thus the very narcissism that
Dorothea invites also brings with it a measure of truth, insofar as people
are not quite so disconnected from each other as she may, at this moment
in the novel, wish to believe: ‘‘The difference between the two kinds of
imagination . . . may not, under scrutiny, be all that clear.’’ In any case,
Dorothea cannot simply ‘‘cast out’’ Casaubon as a narcissist in his own
right because he is not simply ‘‘an exteriorized embodiment of a mode of
imagination threateningly antithetical to hers.’’14 He also stands as a fig-
ure of emotional illegibility, which the moral imagination can never fully
ignore or triumph over.
For Hertz, identification tends to blur boundaries and erode capaci-
ties for differentiation between self and other. Eliot’s characters seem to
have permeability in their social lineaments, the quality that, I have been
arguing, has so greatly confounded readers of James’s late fiction. The
difference is not that Eliot fails to account for complex identifications by
conceding a premature contrast between Dorothea and Casaubon. It is
that her decided belief in the ultimate goodness of human connection
seems to weather all possible conditions and to triumph over any possi-
ble check, almost before relationships have a chance to fail. It is no acci-
dent that Hertz seems to spend most of his book focusing on Eliot’s mar-
ginal characters, since it is with them that the author risks an exploration
of social failure. Still, that risk is not taken as far as it might, and one gen-
13. Neil Hertz, George Eliot’s Pulse (Stanford University Press, 2003), 29.
14. Ibid., 30, 29.
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erally sees Eliot edging toward a vague recovery process for the charac-
ters she has not banished from the narrative.15
The problem with Eliot’s approach to characterization, as James com-
plained of it, was that ‘‘she proceeds from the abstract to the concrete;
that her figures and situations are evolved, as the phrase is, from her
moral consciousness, and are only indirectly the products of observa-
tion. . . . The world was, first and foremost, for George Eliot, the moral,
the intellectual world; the personal spectacle came after.’’16 This does
not mean that Eliot simply dressed up abstract moral qualities and called
them people; it is more that her characters could not but reveal within
their own unique desires the orderly nature of a society that refuses so-
cial and moral fragmentation.
Middlemarch’s diffuseness, as James labeled it, is a consequence of the
conception of society its form tries to capture. Relations in the novel are
themselves diffuse and undefined—working, evidently, but without ade-
quate dramatic proof of what they accomplish or to what they lead. Eliot
must simply insist upon them as a precondition of her sometimes anxious
moral idealism. We have to assume that Dorothea’s kindness or Lydgate’s
liberality has ultimate, though dispersed, effects. In other words, we must
assume a structured social world of interlocking relationships. As Leo Ber-
sani argues, Eliot ‘‘won’t abandon the dream of structured significance’’
—a society whose idealized unity and orderliness are already preserved for
it in advance—‘‘even if she has to sustain it by the vague doctrine of indivi-
dual goodness finally, in some way, affecting the course of history, or by
the more desperate move of showing how the very subversion of her pro-
tagonists’ dreams is itself a proof of the interconnectedness in life.’’17 The
desires of characters are themselves structured by and mirrored in a tissue
of already fashioned communities. If characters change, it is because they
come up against this matrix of preexisting relationships and find them-
selves needing to adjust. The saving power of human connection is the
seed of communal life that remains even when specific communities totter
before the flows of history and threaten to founder.
James, on the other hand, wishes to show not only how characters change
as they confront social reality, but—since reality itself is only the sum of
the improvised and unprepared connections to it—how the social sphere
15. For Hertz, the trace that remains of certain marginal characters—and their disturb-
ing presence in the narrative—offers an allegory of the equivocal nature of signification
itself, ‘‘the open and indeterminate self-dispersion associated with a plurality of signs or
with the plurality of interpretations that writing can provoke’’ (ibid., 30–31).
16. Henry James, ‘‘The Life of George Eliot,’’ in The Critical Muse: Selected Literary Criti-
cism, ed. Roger Gard (New York: Penguin, 1987), 208.
17. Leo Bersani, A Future for Astyanax: Character and Desire in Literature (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1984), 64.
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remains open to transformation as individual agents access and modify it.
Genuine change cannot be anticipated or established outside of the ways
people steer a course through their situation. In fact, for James, change
may be the only constant. To call James a situational novelist, then, is ulti-
mately to state that he does something different with character from his
nineteenth-century precedents. His modes of characterization are also dif-
ferent, as we shall see, from those of Conrad, his junior by fourteen years,
whose modernist credentials are more confidently burnished but whose
early writing, in my opinion, has roots in moral Romanticism.
T R A N S C E N D E N T A L S U B J E C T I V I T Y , I M P R O V I S I N G
I N T E L L I G E N C E : T H E C A S E O F C O N R A D
In Modernism and the Fate of Individuality, Michael Levenson compares the
plot of The Ambassadors and that of Heart of Darkness (1899): ‘‘The two
works share . . . most notably, the confrontation between cultures, the
‘sharp rupture of an identity,’ and the transvaluation of values.’’18 ‘‘Both
Marlow and Strether,’’ Levenson notes, ‘‘take exceptional pains to pre-
serve their integrity within morally suspect contexts’’ (3), though, at the
same time, the protagonists cannot simply stand apart from communal
norms: ‘‘The very attempt to extricate moral character from these cruel-
ties [of social life] shows how the ego is composed by the social body,
and how much flesh must be torn if it is to stand alone’’ (58). The affinity
between the two novelists features centrally in Levenson’s account of
early modernism. Focusing on Lord Jim (1900), a novel written directly af-
ter Heart of Darkness and fashioned along similar principles, I would like
to argue, however, that Conrad differs from James in his understanding
of character and his conception of what insures or awakens ethical con-
duct. It should not be surprising that James did not react well to Conrad’s
‘‘obscuration’’ of character, his way of sharpening suspense by invoking ‘‘a
mystic impulse from within’’19—a description James offered in a review
that led to hurt feelings on Conrad’s part.20
The two writers offer separate versions of what might be described as
impulse-driven character. The impulses that concern James are not merely
visceral but are the products of alert, open, agile minds, minds intent upon
overcoming their bewilderment and avoiding obtuseness. Conrad’s Jim is
not nearly as refined as Strether, Charlotte, or Amerigo or inclined to the
same demonstrations of sociability. However, like James’s protagonists, his
18. Michael Levenson, Modernism and the Fate of Individuality: Character and Novelistic Form
from Conrad to Woolf (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 3.
19. Henry James, ‘‘The New Novel,’’ in Gard, Critical Muse, 610.
20. See Roger Gard’s headnote to James, ‘‘New Novel,’’ 595.
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actions do bring about consequences of potentially urgent social signifi-
cance. Jim establishes himself in the narrative as something of a puzzle. In
the capacity of first mate of the Patna, the British officer disregards his duty
to inform some 800 variously dark-skinned passengers on board of his con-
viction that the vessel is in imminent danger of sinking. He and other offi-
cers abandon ship, avoiding the melee awaiting the remaining passengers
aboard when they realize there are too few boats to accommodate everyone.
This cowardly but confounding act, which ‘‘cuts him off from the rest of his
kind,’’ then becomes the symptom of a hidden cause lodged in the hinder
parts of Jim’s character.21 The impulse giving rise to Jim’s ethical lapse,
which on the surface points to the almost criminal selfishness of the man,
refuses to add up to a coherent picture, however. Interpretations of motive
never achieve a seamless fit with the willful idiosyncrasy of Jim’s acts, even if
excuses are not necessarily to be found that pardon those acts: ‘‘The views
[ Jim] let me have of himself were like those glimpses through the shifting
rents in a thick fog—bits of vivid and vanishing detail, giving no connected
idea of the general aspect of a country.’’22 Conrad spends the rest of the
novel excavating the grounds and motives of his action.
While Conrad treats impulses as part of a pattern that emerges from a
disguised ‘‘interior’’ source, James regards his characters’ exertions as a
productive series of improvisations whose implications the narrative hopes
to work out or fine-tune. Clearly a subtle line separates the two versions of
character. In Conrad’s case, character is subject to an intense hermeneutic
demand. Marlow, the narrator, obsesses over the degree to which Jim’s
puzzling, impetuous actions can be linked to an essential facet of his per-
sonality. The appalling surface of appearance becomes an invitation to
analyze buried motives or deep structures of the self. Marlow follows a logic
of substitution whereby any manifestation of an act refers itself to a prior
act and to the psychological design ‘‘behind’’ it that makes it readable.
Ultimately, analysis ends up stalled, unable to bridge the irremediable
divide between surface action and the unfathomable subjectivity that sets
it in motion. Conrad’s novel thus foregrounds the insistent questioning of
the interpreter—in this case, Marlow, who is a proxy for the reader. The
impression of Jim that Conrad registers through Marlow—like all impres-
sionists’ ‘‘bid for immediacy’’—ends up in Jesse Matz’s terms ‘‘featuring
the byproducts of the failure to get it.’’23
21. Joseph Conrad, Lord Jim (New York: Bantam, 1965), 19.
22. Ibid., 48.
23. Jesse Matz, Literary Impressionism and Modernist Aesthetics (Cambridge University Press,
2001), 11. Unlike Conrad, James conceives of impressions as augmenting or altering reality,
if only because they create new avenues of possible response to what one sees. Matz’s account
neglects the vitalistic ontology underpinning James’s proposition that ‘‘fiction is an impres-
sion’’ (1), especially the implication that impressions do not just bear upon the past but on a
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In 1975, Tzvetan Todorov suggested that the psychological and moral
center that Marlow travels in search of in Heart of Darkness is ‘‘empty.’’24
Various deconstructionist readings have taken up the idea, suggesting that
the novel resists plumbing its characters for meaning or explanation, dra-
matizing instead an intrinsic perplexity about character itself.25 Geoffrey
Harpham proposes that Conrad’s twentieth-century critics assimilated him
too quickly ‘‘to Freud and the general notion of the unconscious,’’ and that
the real issue is not character penetration but identification—specifically
Marlow’s ‘‘ambiguous, passionate, and nonreciprocal’’ identifications with
characters like Jim and Kurtz: ‘‘The general idea Marlow ‘represents’ is that
boundaries between people are porous and transgressable—that identity is
fluid and less crystallized or ‘mastered’ than we generally think.’’26 It is not
obvious to me, however, why the unconscious does not apply as a suitable
explanation for the identifications he has in mind, or why he resorts to new
terms like ‘‘surconscious’’ to describe Marlow’s ‘‘involuntary and traumatic’’
recognitions of confraternity, except perhaps because he believes that Con-
rad is skeptical of finding something positive or substantial in the structural
interior (what Lacan would call the ‘‘real’’).27 At any rate, Conradian charac-
ter demands to be interpreted, and the resistance it poses to interpretation
makes one feel the charge of the demand. Clearly it is worth connecting the
solicitation to interpretation—and the investments entailed therein—with
the failing results.
In Lord Jim, I want to suggest, ethical life consists in awakening to the fact
that surface demonstrations of character do not adequately present or en-
capsulate the moral basis of action, the ‘‘supersensible’’ freedom that Kant
claimed to be at the core of agency. Character exceeds all attempts to
resolve or grasp it and retains a transcendental aura of sublimity that makes
of all empirical facts a deceiving or impossible measure of the force of the
reality yet unmade. As James famously says in ‘‘The Art of Fiction’’—in a passage that Matz
and I read differently—‘‘Experience is never limited, and it is never complete’’ (Henry
James, ‘‘The Art of Fiction,’’ in Gard, Critical Muse, 194).
24. Tzvetan Todorov, Genres in Discourse, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge University
Press, 1990), 111.
25. See J. Hillis Miller, Poets of Reality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965),
and his later statement, ‘‘Heart of Darkness Revisited,’’ in Conrad Revisited: Essays for the Eight-
ies, ed. Ross C. Murfin (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1985), 31–50. See also
Perry Meisel, ‘‘Decentering Heart of Darkness,’’ Modern Language Studies 8 (1978): 20–28; and
Arnold Krupat, ‘‘Antonymy, Language, and Value in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness,’’ The Mis-
souri Review 3 (1979): 63–85.
26. Geoffrey Galt Harpham, ‘‘Beyond Mastery: The Future of Conrad’s Beginnings,’’ in
Conrad in the Twenty-First Century: Contemporary Approaches and Perspectives, ed. Carola M.
Kaplan, Peter Lancelot Mallois, and Andrea White (New York: Routledge, 2005), 33, 20.
27. Ibid., 35. Harpham cites Lacan in his book on Conrad, suggesting that he is not
entirely averse to the deployment of psychoanalytic concepts. See Geoffrey Galt Harpham,
One of Us: The Mastery of Joseph Conrad (University of Chicago Press, 1997), 12.
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person. If Conrad fails to discover a coherent structure of desire that orga-
nizes identity, he insists on a higher definition of human integrity, namely,
the capacity to act autonomously, a power that he posits apart from any spe-
cific circumstance. In this sense, Conrad’s account of moral life is exactly
the opposite of the one Levenson attributes to him when he suggests that
the author’s language is bent upon collapsing fact and value, or empirical
description and moral appraisal.28 In the case of Lord Jim, any contingent
understanding of Jim’s motives may suffice as a local claim to knowledge
on Marlow’s part, but it leaves the sensible unity of Jim’s character unre-
solved. Conrad aims for a ‘‘total’’ account of character; this is why he privi-
leges last words and final acts. Yet passionate inquiry requires that one give
up on empirical sensibility as a means of fathoming it: ‘‘Are not our lives
too short for that full utterance which through all our stammerings is of
course our only and abiding intention?’’29 Like less metaphorical forms of
utterance—Kurtz’s ‘‘The Horror! the Horror!’’ for instance—language sig-
nals or gestures at something beyond linguistic competence, dissolving at
key moments into a cry or stutter, ‘‘no more than a breath,’’ at the vanishing
point of reference.30 In the vein of his Romantic counterparts, Conrad has
to use language to evoke what cannot be directly represented: a transcen-
dental capacity for freedom that commonsense understandings cannot
grasp directly.
According to William Bonney, Conrad is obsessed with the thematics
of suspense or suspension, ‘‘wherein all attempts to act against status quo
imperial capitalism are systematically disallowed, suspended, in a para-
lyzing miasma of existential and psychological confusions.’’31 Bonney
points out that the motif of suspension recurs throughout Conrad’s ca-
reer. But the suspensions that Conrad explores are not, as they are in
James, meant as a preliminary to action or an accompaniment of it. The
actions never come; Conrad’s politics contemplate ‘‘the reinscription or
deconstruction of ideas which, regardless, remain suspended in the inef-
fectual realm of discourse.’’32 His uncertainties about the consequences
of human acts often have to do with the contradictions he sees between
human freedom in all of its moral ambiguity and ruinous—because de-
luded—idealizations of integrity that are driven by ideology.
28. ‘‘The thought that moral life is not superimposed on experience, that the authority
of the moral beyond already lies securely within the domain of fact, and that in order to pur-
sue value we need only perceive with acuity—this thought is central to the workings of
[Heart of Darkness]’’ (Levenson, Modernism, 56).
29. Conrad, Lord Jim, 145.
30. Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, ed. Paul B. Armstrong (New York: Norton, 2006), 69.
31. William W. Bonney, ‘‘Suspended,’’ in Kaplan, Mallois, and White, Conrad in the
Twenty-First Century, 175.
32. Ibid., 176.
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Despite obvious parallels, the difference between James’s and Con-
rad’s handling of character should be apparent. In James, one cannot at-
tribute the implications of an event to the isolated intention of any pro-
tagonist, but not because intentions, irrespective of the situation, crumble
and perish at the bottom of an immense and formless cradle of agency.
Instead, he depicts motives and desires as embryonic distillations of some
quite definite process of coming to an insight or an understanding. For
James, meanings assume a kind of holding pattern as characters seek out
possible ways of clarifying or anchoring them in actions that are still in pro-
gress. In other words, James’s meanings generally point at the future,
whereas in Conrad, they are aimed, if anywhere, in a backward-looking
direction. Conrad teases readers with the possibility of discovering the
antecedents of a character’s intentions (the integrity of personality under-
neath the veil) or, barring that possibility, of glimpsing the transcendent
kernel that lies behind the situation and is reflected only indirectly in it—
as moonshine reflects and diffuses rays emitted by another source (this
being one of Conrad’s most celebrated metaphors in Heart of Darkness).
The desires that James portrays, on the other hand, are situation specific
and rarely descend into the allegorical generalities of Heart of Darkness
or Lord Jim.33
T H E S O C I A L C H A R A C T E R O F I N T E N T I O N A L I T Y
Eliot and Conrad rely on different standards of consistency as a basis for
defining character, but both suggest a predetermined quality absent in
James. Eliot thinks that her characters’ lives are held together by inesca-
pable social ties. Situations tend merely to prove that personal destiny, in-
scribed in desire itself, is commensurable with, or at least bound to, the
fixed necessity of structured human relations. Conrad, by contrast, sets
out to expose the ideology at issue in presuming such a necessity. One can-
not take for granted that communal norms establish a coherent founda-
tion for ethical life because the social body is composed of highly variable
and conflictual interests. Yet the specific intentions of Conrad’s heroic
characters are just as likely to be disinterested as self-interested—referring
back to a ground of freedom that diminishes all actions’ psychological
claim to inevitability. On the other hand, by exposing the erratic side of
human behavior, Conrad also bears witness to the kernel of autonomy that
bears fruit in his characters’ surprising actions. This autonomy guarantees,
if not consistent action, then a mysterious dignity of action.
James does not assume that there is a preconceived unity to character;
on the other hand, he thinks it possible to fashion a consistent or contin-
33. On the allegorical resonances of Heart of Darkness, see Todorov, Genres in Discourse, 112.
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uous ground for action. Human freedom, for him, is not so much erratic
as interactive. Rather than seeking a constant set of characteristics or
capacities that define a self across different environments, he examines
selfhood as a series of contacts, relations, and tensions with those environ-
ments. As I have already suggested, there is something emergent within
those relations that—in order to be grasped—require James’s protago-
nists to suspend or forestall their actions at crucial narrative moments.
Before going on to situate James’s standard of consistency via vitalist psy-
chology, I would like to examine some specific moments of suspended
agency in The Golden Bowl to flesh out how they arise from the interactive
or socially defined character of the situations at hand.
As book 2 opens, Maggie’s nascent recognitions about the compro-
mised state of her marriage—her feeling of being passed around like a
‘‘dressed doll’’ while another drama is unfolding out of her sight—take the
form of ‘‘instinctive postponements of reflection’’ (GB, 274, 245). She
finds herself, in James’s metaphor, circling around her situation as though
it were a pagoda too imposing and too impenetrable to enter directly.
Later she dismisses the immediate impulse to denounce Charlotte, which
‘‘reigned for her . . . [as] that fascination of the monstrous, that temptation
of the horribly possible’’ (GB, 383). Maggie’s suspensions are the most sig-
nificant in the book, but similar instances of forestalled agency occur in
the other leading characters—for instance, in the prince’s effort not to
react in haste to Charlotte’s initial appearance prior to his marriage, or,
for that matter, the efforts on the part of Charlotte, Adam Verver, or the
prince to delay a reaction at various moments of confusion or irresolution.
Characters do not merely hold off acting in order to catch up with their
situation; they put off determining exactly where their own or others’
interests lie, and even, as I have been suggesting, to some degree what they
desire.
These moments of delay or suspension are due, in part, to the fact that
interests are mutually entangled within the situation. Maggie cannot act,
of course, without sacrificing her father in the process, which she is loath
to do. Additionally, and perhaps even more fundamentally, James sug-
gests that something about the involvement of one character with
another’s fate disrupts normal ways of marking boundaries between peo-
ple and apportioning interests. The philosopher Robert Pippin has
offered the most serious recent consideration of the profound moral
dilemmas that emerge in James’s novels when, in a term he adopts from
James, all meanings are ‘‘negotiated,’’ and when one consciousness is per-
force reliant on another.34 Pippin emphasizes two points that bear upon
34. Robert Pippin, Henry James and Modern Moral Life (Cambridge University Press, 2000),
64, hereafter cited parenthetically as HJ.
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what he calls the social character of intentionality: first, that a person’s
identity achieves definition through its dependencies on others; second,
that these dependencies are not abstract claims to special rights that are
granted regardless of the situation. In other words, Pippin’s James is no
Kantian. James depicts forms of dependency that are felt in characters’
activities, in their complex engagements with other people, and in the
resulting social configurations they erect and settle upon. In Pippin’s
description, consciousness is not simply ‘‘of ’’ something; in James, it is con-
sciousness of somebody’s consciousness of you. He describes James’s ambi-
tious effort to challenge cognitive schemas that claim to describe how
beliefs and intentions are structured. Pippin’s account seems right, as far
as it goes. But I want to take a slightly different direction by showing how
these suspensions of interest as well as of agency are not only a source of
deep ethical worry for James but also a crucial, affirmative element of ethi-
cal life.
To get a better sense both of Pippin’s insight and of where I differ, it is
worth dwelling for a moment on his account of the scene between Adam
Verver and his daughter in the billiard room at Fawns. Verver has re-
treated to this room to hide from the fortune-hunting women who he is
afraid are after him now that Maggie, his daughter, is married and, having
no public claim upon his attention, can no longer shield him from their
pursuit. The thing that Pippin seizes on is the ‘‘mute passage’’ between fa-
ther and daughter:
At the very moment when this ‘‘silent explosion’’ of revelation occurs, when
Adam sees that Maggie sees him now as a newly independent agent in their
relation, he suddenly and for the first time realizes this fact and its many
possible implications for himself, but again, only through or because of
seeing it in her. . . . Maggie . . . also sees that her father sees this in her, realizes
that he has seen her view of him in this new way, and the implication is that
her relation to him will now change because he will see from now on that she
has this new concern. . . . And as if all these gymnastics weren’t enough, James
doesn’t leave it there. For not only do they come to see each other differently
through or by means of these perceptions and perceptions of perceptions,
they both come to see how their relation to each other as a couple in the
world has altered by seeing that they are both seen in a new way. (HJ, 75)
Oddly, James renders this moment of the father’s awareness of separa-
tion from his daughter, which Pippin admirably paraphrases, by showing
how he experiences it through her, understanding its ramifications for
her. Pippin worries that such moments create agents who are insuffi-
ciently individuated; they cannot settle on discrete conceptions of their
well-being or exert their free mutuality. Adam and Maggie’s dependen-
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cies therefore ‘‘might seem to threaten to dissolve the integrity of any self
into its social constitution’’ (HJ, 126).
Before simply labeling James’s characteristic representation of extrav-
agantly interconnected interests as a ‘‘great moral crash’’ (HJ, 77), it is
worth noting that Verver’s exchange of looks leads him soon after to a
specific action, that of contemplating marriage, settling on that course
in order to spare his daughter worry about his vulnerability to grasping,
calculating women. However misguided Verver’s eventual crystallization
of motives, his action originates in a moment of lingering impressions,
which leads him to restore equilibrium to his tangle of relations by ren-
dering his own interests permeable. James thinks that social solutions,
good or bad, come not from people removing themselves from the mesh
of their relations but only from their substituting one set of relations for
another. But in order to figure out what these sometimes subtle and muta-
ble forms of affiliation are or could be, individuals are required to trace
them out by feeling how their thoughts reverberate upon their confeder-
ates, while also temporarily suspending action. The failure to start out with
explicit motives or interests does not prevent people from acting forcefully
at some later point in a situation. In their early confusion, though, charac-
ters often proceed through incremental adjustments or improvised im-
pulses (even if these end up having far-reaching effects), such as when—
in the book’s most prominent example—Maggie decides not to confront
Charlotte or the prince directly after learning of an affair merely by sens-
ing an alteration in her relation to her husband and, instead, begins to
make small changes to her marital routine.
The itinerary of Pippin’s argument offers interesting parallels to vital-
ist theories. I draw attention to the connection because, as it seems to me,
Henry James relies on a broadly vitalistic conception of agency. James’s
presumption, like Bergson’s, is that people are guided by impulses and
are thrust into action before they have a chance to register all the rela-
tions forming around them. For his part, Pippin thinks that the under-
standings that James’s characters attain in social life are not isolated cog-
nitive attitudes or beliefs but involve dispositions to act: ‘‘What looks like
‘an awareness’ [in the sort of society of The Golden Bowl ] turns out to be
much more provisional and temporally unstable, often as much an uncer-
tain, hesitant anticipation of another’s understanding as anything that
could be described cognitively, often as much a first draft of an intention,
something that comes to clarity, necessarily, only long after the deed’’
(HJ, 16–17). Pippin ends up seeing things in much the same way as Berg-
son does. Compare the foregoing account with Bergson’s way of concep-
tualizing perception. The world, for him, simply consists of what he calls
images. When one perceives, one does not illuminate those images or
extract a representation from them; matter is not radically distinct from
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one’s perception of it. The difference is that ‘‘my perception displays, in
the midst of the image world, as would their outward reflection or shadow,
the eventual or possible actions of my body.’’ Thus perception allows me to
prepare ‘‘the reaction of my body to the action of external objects.’’35 Both
philosophers consider perception to be a way of refracting the whole field
of relations through the prism of one’s provisional or possible action. A
perception is always halfway toward an intention or a tendency toward
action, or something clarified by an intention or tendency. On this view,
the emphasis is on how people interrogate their feelings by inclining to act
in a particular way and thus alighting upon intentions or working them
out. As Bergson argues, to perceive something is to make one kind of prag-
matic incision into experience. Perceptions isolate and simplify experi-
ence, putting complicated relations into useful shorthand that allows one
to make difficult decisions.36
To go back to Henry James, the perceptions explored in his fiction have
something of the nebulousness of future possibilities inscribed within them.
Because they hinge on dense social transactions, they are even more than
customarily incomplete or unfinished. Something anticipatory presents
itself in James’s rendering of consciousness that cannot be captured in a sin-
gle moment extracted from the continuum, and which any description
would render only rudimentarily, by finding dots to connect where there is
a sea of forces. Hence James begins the chapter following the exchange of
glances between Verver and Maggie with a vitalistic image of the conse-
quences: ‘‘So much mute communication was doubtless, all this time, mar-
vellous, and we may confess to having perhaps read into the scene, prema-
turely, a critical character that took longer to develop. Yet the quiet hour of
reunion enjoyed that afternoon by the father and the daughter did really lit-
tle else than deal with the elements definitely presented to each in the vibra-
tion produced by the return of the church-goers’’ (GB, 92). James plays up
vibrations and their reverberations, not a spontaneous understanding,
though he does rule out the former’s leading to the latter.
In many respects Pippin’s account follows Bergsonian lines, but his
emphasis incurs a vitalist objection: he accentuates the role that beliefs
play as intermediaries of action. His underestimation of James’s fluid
and ambiguous situations has to do with his sense that consciousness
35. Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer (New York:
Zone, 1991), 22, 23.
36. Bergson thinks that perceptions make actions manageable, even if they also poten-
tially distort the world by simplifying and schematizing it, patterning an impression on re-
membered objects. They are ‘‘‘signs’ that recall to us former images. The convenience and
the rapidity of perception are bought at this price; but hence also springs every kind of illu-
sion’’ (ibid., 33).
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requires clear guideposts for enabling social exchange.37 Beliefs about
other people’s motives do this work: they introduce a ‘‘normative dimen-
sion of meaning and intelligibility’’ into everyday discriminations and
enable rituals of interaction and communication (HJ, 66). Bergson, on
the other hand, stresses action above cognition and a drama of doing
over a drama of understanding. Pippin, like many other James scholars,
is not a strict cognitivist who universally demands a clear discursive basis
for assessing intentions, and he readily accepts the possibility that the
novelty of certain experiences may make evaluation of them difficult,
but he focuses on the particular understandings that James’s characters
come to have or fail to have of one another, rather than the social world
they build or the forms of relationship they set in motion.38 He gives pri-
ority to epistemic over action-oriented criteria for gauging situations.
For Bergson and, I would argue, for Henry James, to give primacy to
beliefs or fixed assessments of a situation is to live at an intellectual dis-
tance from the world.39 Beliefs about motive are incapable of keeping up
with the variegated relations between people. In James, one might even
say that explicit judgments, reasoned assessments, and defined attitudes
seem to get in the way of a more primary intuitive analysis of one’s own
relations to another, as they decompose and recompose in ways not ame-
nable to causal or rational accounting. The qualities of insight that James
respects seem to have a lot to do with how characters seize upon certain
kinds of salience, how they settle upon one set of approximate possibili-
ties at the expense of another, and finally how they orient or adhere to
their choices as they attempt to reconfigure their current situation. He is
preoccupied by a protagonist’s manner of attending to a thing rather than
the strictly theoretical question of what the character knows or believes.
37. Pippin thinks that beliefs confer trust and conviction in the institutions, practices,
and traditions that convey meaning. They allow one to assess ‘‘the rightness of actions’’ (HJ,
66) by confirming or envisaging realistic interpretations of them. He isolates a problem
endemic to a secular, self-interested society: people have difficulty assigning meaning and
locating authority, which leads to troubles assessing one another’s aims and undertakings
on the basis of their fit with available normative contexts.
38. For examples of other critics who display a similar emphasis, see Jonathan Levin,
who turns to ‘‘gaps in [characters’] communication,’’ things left ‘‘unsaid’’ (Poetics of Transi-
tion, 144); or Sharon Cameron, who describes the impossibility in James of having ‘‘shared
reference’’ (Thinking in Henry James [University of Chicago Press, 1989], 95).
39. See, for instance, Bergson’s attempt to mark out and celebrate what is most radical
in the philosophy of William James: ‘‘For him those truths it is most important for us to
know, are truths which have been felt and experienced before being thought.’’ Rather than
regard true assessments of reality as working on the basis of a ‘‘resemblance of a portrait to
the model,’’ we have to adopt a pragmatic relationship to a reality that ‘‘is singular . . . [and]
changing’’ (Henri Bergson, ‘‘On the Pragmatism of William James,’’ in Creative Mind: An Intro-
duction to Metaphysics [New York: Carol, 1992], 213).
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R E L A T I O N A L B E I N G
To the extent that James’s protagonists elude a substantialist standard of
consistency—one based on psychic structures that predetermine iden-
tity—a number of critics have taken his late novels as evidence of ethical
life gone awry. Even Pippin, who regards James as offering a plausible
moral psychology, thinks that James’s ‘‘sophisticated world of supremely
intelligent mirrors’’ leaves the core of character or the autonomous
heart ‘‘too weak to do much pumping, too endlessly qualifiable, to serve
any real moral, judgmental purpose’’ (HJ, 86, 127). What such viewpoints
overlook is the possibility of alternative parameters of characterization,
ones that, I argue, are based on a ‘‘superficial’’ but credible vitalist standard.
The challenges that critics mount to Jamesian character have tended
to veer in contrary directions, which one could label the arelational and
the hyperrelational account of consciousness. Yet this divergence may
ultimately be less revealing than the places where these critics converge.
Sharon Cameron and Leo Bersani offer influential versions of these
paradigmatic alternatives. Both critics end up claiming that James’s solu-
tions do not obey realist strictures, while I want to see him as breaking
ground for a new kind of realism. According to Bersani, James ‘‘drama-
tizes the possibility of an intentionality unsupported by motive, that is, of
a desiring self so responsive and so indefinite that it is created entirely
(but never limited) by the responses to its performances.’’40 He suggests
that this desiring self diffuses itself into what amounts to a set of linguistic
performances detached from psychology. ‘‘Language’’ in James ‘‘would no
longer reveal character or refer to desires ‘behind’ words’’; the ‘‘I’’ merely
becomes a ‘‘neutral territory’’ that is ‘‘by nature always ‘outside’ any particu-
lar self.’’41 Cameron, on the other hand, argues that consciousness is given
the power to define rather than attune itself to the situation around it. James-
ian consciousness is so all-encompassing and arelational that it swallows up
any opposing perspective.
Since James depicts characters whose identity is not dependent on
any solid, interior foundation, Cameron simply concludes that he releases
consciousness from empirical constraint, either by evacuating all other
40. Bersani, Future for Astyanax, 137.
41. Ibid., 137, 146. Bersani’s position has parallels with that of Tzvetan Todorov, who
suggests that the elaborations of talk in The Awkward Age (1899), filled with indirect speech
and increasingly far-flung circumlocutions, liberate language from its reference to reality.
See Todorov, Genres in Discourse, 125, 126. I would suggest, however, that the conversations
about conversations that Todorov finds everywhere in The Awkward Age do not insulate fic-
tion from reality but in fact are, for James, a form of reality. Our relations to the world, our
impressions of it derived from banter and casual talk, simply construct the mode of being-
in-the-world of those in ‘‘society.’’
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persons from the scene described, as James putatively does in The American
Scene (1904–7); by authorizing a single consciousness to project its own
understandings onto social situations; or finally by allowing a central char-
acter’s consciousness to deny shared meaning at all. She associates the lat-
ter two strategies with The Golden Bowl . Because they do not obey limits,
James’s characters do not amount to plausible psychological agents: ‘‘An
account of consciousness as psychologized understands consciousness as a
phenomenon associated with subjectivity: as internal, centered, circum-
scribed, fixed. Conversely, a poststructuralist account (the dominant criti-
cal alternative) critiques and dismisses the idea of such a center, concep-
tually replacing the structure of consciousness with the structure of the
sign and then proceeding to deconstruct that. In the chapters above I read
James against the traditional account of consciousness as psychologized,
arguing that consciousness in James’s novels is not internal, not centered,
not associated with subjectivity.’’42 Cameron refurbishes the critical bias
against psychological approaches by approving a poststructuralist frame-
work. But by lumping all ‘‘traditional accounts’’ of psychology together,
she ignores many alternative psychological theories of the period, includ-
ing the one presented by James’s own brother. If, as Cameron says, con-
sciousness in late James exerts ‘‘magical claims’’—if James divorces power
from any realistic exercise of it—then he succeeds only in hypostatizing
the imagination.43 Her account would seem to demonstrate that con-
sciousness in James is little short of delusional, ignoring at great peril what
Freud would call the Reality Principle. In any case, Cameron, like other
critics, seems to presume that characters such as Maggie know exactly what
they want and proceed to get it. I would like to say, in contrast, that Maggie
only has makeshift knowledge and must learn how to accommodate reality
as much as reality has to bend to accommodate her.
For Bersani, the self-inventiveness that James dramatizes ultimately
empties out all personal identity, resolving social discord by transform-
ing personal motives into depersonalized art, therefore liberating the
novel from any worry about strictly human-centered need. A reality that
is resistant to easy forms of resolution—for example, the shocked betrayal
that lays the dramatic foundation for The Golden Bowl —succumbs at the
end to the ‘‘artistic manipulation of life’s materials’’ as Maggie turns her
marriage into a superior fiction.44 His argument contributes to a critical
inclination, evident already from the time of character criticism, that ei-
ther celebrates or decries—but in any case, insists upon—James’s subordi-
nation of any single fictive personage’s interest or point of view to a larger
42. Cameron, Thinking in Henry James, 170–71. See 102 for a summary of her argument.
43. Ibid., 41.
44. Bersani, Future for Astyanax, 146.
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aesthetic order.45 Maggie creates a new reality by absorbing everything
and everyone into her artful vision and, it would seem, by recasting herself
in the same way that her fictive vision recasts the lives of others.
Michael Snediker’s recent effort to grapple with Bersani’s argument
has fruitfully updated his approach to character. While Bersani thinks
that James’s narrative solutions are unsatisfying because psychic life is
too malleable—that is, because character remains too much in the realm
of imaginary linguistic inventions—Snediker counters by inventorying
the narrative elements that anchor character in a materialist way. He sug-
gests that the consistency of James’s selves is procured by their mysteri-
ous patience and by ‘‘their dependencies on the temporal.’’ Maggie’s
‘‘faith in time’’ enables her to repair the compromising asymmetry that
has occurred in her marriage, allowing an impaired reality to bend to-
ward a new ethical order: ‘‘Maggie’s most impassioned relation is to nei-
ther her father nor her husband but to time itself. Time will determine
the degree to which her fictions get to count as truth; time will deter-
mine . . . the degree to which meaning will work in her favor.’’46 The sug-
gestion is helpful, but it abstracts or hypostasizes time in a peculiar way
and says too little about what the measured forms of inaction he de-
scribes accomplish in the novel, except that patience—the restraint placed
upon doing anything—allows characters to hold off dealing with immedi-
ate realities and prevents a catastrophic literalism from taking hold of the
situation.47
I want to follow up on my previous assertion that personality is not the
only means of generating psychic consistency. Other and indeed suppler
means arise from vitalist psychology. Bergson famously argues that mental
states ‘‘continually [swell] with duration’’ and that there is no substratum to
reality, no ‘‘impassive ego,’’ to unite separate phenomenal manifestations
of the same self.48 His claim bears obvious relation to William James’s original
formation regarding the ‘‘stream of consciousness’’: ‘‘Consciousness, then,
45. For examples of such character criticism, see F. O. Matthiessen, Henry James: The
Major Phase (Oxford University Press, 1944); and Laurence B. Holland, The Expense of Vision:
Essays on the Craft of Henry James (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). To see
the recurrence and remobilization of claims about the aesthetic nature of James’s novelistic
resolutions, see Jonathan Freedman, Professions of Taste: Henry James, British Aestheticism, and
Commodity Culture (Stanford University Press, 1990). See also F. R. Leavis, who argues that
our sympathy ought to lie with Charlotte and Adam Verver and that James, who clearly
weighs the case otherwise, may have lost his moral sense in his elaborate oversubtlety (F. R.
Leavis, The Great Tradition: George Eliot, Henry James, Joseph Conrad [London: Chatto & Windus,
1948], 159–63).
46. Michael Snediker, ‘‘Stasis and Verve: Henry James and the Fictions of Patience,’’ The
Henry James Review 27 (2006): 25.
47. Ibid., 40.
48. Bergson, Creative Evolution, 2, 4.
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does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as ‘chain’ or ‘train’
do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing
jointed; it flows. A ‘river’ or a ‘stream’ are the metaphors by which it is most
naturally described. In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of
consciousness, or of subjective life.’’49 James avails himself of the ‘‘stream’’ meta-
phor in order to describe what is continuous and ‘‘without breach, crack,
or division’’ in psychic life.50 Instead of positing an abstract sameness at the
core of identity, he, like Bergson, propounds psychic models grounded
only in continuity. For his part, Bergson suggests that ‘‘an ego which does
not change does not endure,’’ playing on the etymological propinquity to
the term ‘‘duration’’ and suggesting that only things with a plastic quality
can survive the test of time.51
Less often cited, though integral to understanding what James means
by stream of thought, is the statement he settles upon to explain the form
of coordination among thoughts: ‘‘Each pulse of cognitive consciousness,
each Thought, dies away and is replaced by another. The other, among
the things it knows, knows its own predecessor, greets it, saying: ‘Thou art
mine, and part of the same self with me.’ Each later Thought, knowing
and including thus the Thoughts which went before, is the final recepta-
cle—and appropriating them is the final owner—of all that they contain
and own. Each Thought is thus born an owner, and dies owned, transmit-
ting whatever it realized as its Self to its own later proprietor.’’52 Con-
sciousness is not an ‘‘entity’’ but an orientation or a function, as James
clarifies in a subsequent essay.53 As such, it resists objectification. As Rob-
ert D. Richardson glosses James, ‘‘We should have our eye on the process
as well as—perhaps more than—the product, on the path as well as the
goal.’’54 A stream of thought, then, is not any particular private content of
a subject’s experience but a process of relating or ‘‘owning’’ whereby a
thought directs itself to its object, appropriates it, and in turn becomes
appropriated. First in a position of structuring experience and framing
objects in the world, a thought later dies and becomes an object to be
framed. It gains its coherence not in itself but in the various relations it
maintains with its objects, which then reorient it.
A stream of thought is nothing but a circuit of relations within the
world. For that reason, consciousness is not an interior condition. As a
49. William James, Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York: Dover, 1950), 1:239.
50. Ibid., 1:237.
51. Bergson, Creative Evolution, 4.
52. James, Principles of Psychology, 1:339.
53. See William James, ‘‘Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?’’ in Essays in Radical Empiricism
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 3–4.
54. Robert D. Richardson, William James: In the Maelstrom of American Modernism (New
York: Houghton, 2006), 235.
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protophenomenologist, James moves from an eighteenth- and nine-
teenth-century picture of the psyche as a self-contained receptacle for
mental content (ideas) and toward a model of consciousness whose con-
sistency comes from being directed onto objects in the world.55 He under-
stands intentionality to be not a one-way process but a reciprocal activity,
which does as much to determine what conscious agents are as it does to
construct and give shape to what they take in. Transcendental notions of
subjectivity take for granted that one has a core of unchanging structures
that underlies and gives shape to one’s activity, while William James sees
activity, the activity of a thinking process, as the basis from which one
alights upon structures (including, I would argue, structures of desire).
Both William and Henry share a conception of reality built upon the
insistence, in Jonathan Levin’s terms, ‘‘that nothing has its identity in
itself. Everything is instead what its dynamic web of relations constitutes
it as.’’56 Thus Henry James remarked to Hugh Walpole shortly after
finishing The Ambassadors that ‘‘the whole thing . . . is a picture of rela-
tions’’—to which I would add, principally ones created and maintained
in thought.57 Despite their disagreements, both brothers understand
thought to be a reality-producing event.58 Agents are not left passive in
the face of a priori structures that determine their capacity to think (as
Kantian transcendentalists maintain) or passive in the face of a world of
objects whose structures organize their experience (the assertion of Lock-
ean empiricism). Consciousness involves a whole series of receptive ten-
dencies—effort, attention, perception, and imagination—the activity of
which seems to promote an active attunement to things. When Maggie
breathes out to her friend Fanny her astonishing knowledge of the affair
between her husband and Charlotte, James remarks that ‘‘the situation
55. For an account that appraises William James as a protophenomenologist, a concep-
tual and historical forerunner of Husserl (the philosopher who formalized phenomenol-
ogy as a branch of philosophy), see James Edie, William James and Phenomenology (Blooming-
ton: Indiana University Press, 1987).
56. Levin, Poetics of Transition, 122.
57. Henry James to Hugh Walpole, August 14, 1912, in The Letters of Henry James, ed.
Percy Lubbock, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1920), 2:254.
58. James’s sympathy with and approval of key elements of his brother William James’s
philosophy does not prevent them from parting company on aesthetic grounds, an issue
that dominates quite a number of their letters. ‘‘Philosophically, . . . I am ‘with’ you, almost
completely,’’ Henry writes to him (Henry James to William James, November 23, 1905, in
William and Henry James: Selected Letters, ed. Ignas K. Skrupskelis and Elizabeth M. Berkeley
[Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1997], 467), though he also dismisses his
brother’s complaints about the ‘‘twilight or mustiness’’ in his plots, the ‘‘fencing in the dia-
logue,’’ and the lack of ‘‘straightness in the style’’ (William James to Henry James, October
22, 1905, ibid., 463). For a fuller exploration of the complicated relationship between Wil-
liam and Henry James, see Ross Posnock, The Trial of Curiosity: Henry James, William James,
and the Challenge of Modernity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
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had changed . . . by the outbreak of the definite’’ (GB, 346). This banal evi-
dence of the power of thought gains considerable poignancy, however,
when one realizes that even definite knowledge is merely a preliminary to
establishing new and as yet undefined relations. Thus Maggie and Fanny
have to keep up a thought process in which possibilities are encompassed,
absorbed, and followed up on. Knowledge is not the endpoint of this pro-
cess, but an invitation to think further and eventually to act. James empha-
sizes that the world is not given but made or fashioned.
E T H I C A L B R E A T H I N G R O O M
What differentiates one consciousness from another in William James’s
account is the particular responsibility that we each have for our own
thoughts and deeds—that is, the particular ownership we take of them,
the feeling of warmth this imparts, the range of special responsibilities
entailed by reflective self-consciousness, and the deliberative commit-
ments entailed therein. Undoubtedly, his brother’s fiction tests the legit-
imacy of this principle by presenting characters who refuse to express
interests altogether detached from those of their intimates, who suspend
action, and who even decline to accept explicit or public responsibility
for their offenses and deeds. According to Pippin, the blurred character
of psychic life—the feeling that mental activities are ‘‘somewhere ‘be-
tween’ and not ‘in’ persons’’—causes James’s characters to lose their psy-
chological and moral sense of orientation (HJ, 64).
As significant and interesting as Pippin’s account of agency is, he does
not seem to find much of affirmative value in the open-endedness of
Jamesian situations. Yet these are precisely the source of imaginative in-
terest for James and for his characters. What they do is to render people
unable to fall back on convenient interpretations and preconceived atti-
tudes. James boosts or enhances the dignity of all persons willing to sub-
mit to the interpretive suspensions that prevent easy moralistic judg-
ments. These suspensions do not, however, stop protagonists from taking
a directed course of action or, once having understood their situation,
from drawing fine distinctions between their own interests and responsi-
bilities and those of others. It is very easy to overstate the degree to which
his characters are subject to a flux of dilute and unbounded identity.59
59. Joseph Litvak explores the concept of theatrical performance as a way of ‘‘unpack
[ing] subjectivity’’ by denaturalizing it, thus rescuing James’s characters from fixed subject
positions (Caught in the Act: Theatricality in the Nineteenth-Century English Novel [Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1992], xii). Leland Person, too, stresses the fluidity of social and
gender roles, describing their suspension through performance, which allows male charac-
ters (his specific focus) ‘‘improvisational freedom to construct a masculine self from a
range of possibilities’’ (Henry James and the Suspense of Masculinity [Philadelphia: University
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James is not the author of limitless self-expansion, as both Bersani and
Cameron suppose in their ways.
I want to suggest that deferral of responsibility is not tantamount to
an abdication of its claims. If we return to the exchange of glances be-
tween Adam Verver and his daughter, the moment of awareness con-
cerns the feeling that his daughter has come to be a ‘‘distinct thing’’ from
him (GB, 91). In principle, at least, Verver sets out with a recognition of
his own and his daughter’s separate responsibilities. Individuation is felt
in terms of the discrete interests that swarm around people as centers of
agency. Nevertheless, the complications present themselves the moment
Maggie’s father enters into a marriage without seeming to make a claim
for his own needs or desires, undertaking the step simply to assuage her
concern over his vulnerability. James insists that all interests are social in
nature, but that does not mean that they are symmetrically apportioned
among parties. Sometimes James’s characters go too far in the direction
of suspending their own interests and responsibilities, but this is just one
morbid extreme, the flip side of a psychology that upends so many tru-
isms about American individualism. Adam may be said to collapse his in-
terest with Maggie’s at an odd but crucial moment and so fail to see dis-
tinctions that are personally and socially necessary. The initial problem
is not that he sees his duties in relation to his daughter but that his act of
overidentification oddly instrumentalizes his own position and, by exten-
sion, that of his future wife. This is as fatal an act as too close an adher-
ence to private interests. Charlotte—the woman he weds—placed as she
is between Maggie and her father, eventually turns to Prince Amerigo for
a passionate connection otherwise foreclosed to her.
Even this eventuality is not a fait accompli from the outset. It is, how-
ever, the likely result of Adam’s failure to acknowledge his difference of
position from that of his daughter. ‘‘Difference of position’’ is not the
same as complete ‘‘independence’’; a Jamesian self is defined by its vari-
ous relations. Charlotte and the prince pursue an affair as a response to a
galling imbalance—or rather, balance—in their own lives. But they do
not tell each other, and are probably incapable of telling themselves, all
the things their affair means to them and those around them. As James
says of Strether in The Ambassadors, another character who takes an un-
precedented wait-and-see attitude to his circumstance, ‘‘I don’t explain
myself even to myself. How can they then understand me?’’60 Charlotte
of Pennsylvania Press, 2003], 20.) But such gender criticism sometimes risks forgetting that
performances require endorsements of the roles characters perform, though Person, at
least, implicitly acknowledges as much in his reading of The Golden Bowl, where Maggie and
Amerigo’s ‘‘gender identities [do not seem to] end in a state of suspense’’ (172).
60. James, Ambassadors, 432.
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and the prince risk a great deal, and they do so to oblige themselves,
though not without considering their spouses. They seal their pledge to
each other with a passionate kiss right at the moment that they reaffirm
their responsibility to Maggie and Adam. Of course, the moment is
meant to be ironic, but what may from the outside appear to be an outra-
geous, self-serving contradiction may also bespeak an inner earnestness
on the part of the pair. James wants readers to entertain the possibility
that interests normally thought to be exclusive can—from a certain
perch—however perilously, coexist.61
It turns out that the prince and Charlotte both misread Maggie. Or
rather, Maggie herself adjusts to the situation in unanticipated ways.
Halfway through, the narrative shifts to focus on her—on her attempt to
shape the implications she sees in her husband’s affair. If a kind of sus-
pension of interests is what precipitates the family discord, the same
open-ended stance and the imaginative identifications it promotes allow
resolution of the conflict by enabling a number of painful but indispen-
sable social accommodations. Maggie forgoes the opportunity to de-
nounce her husband and Charlotte, whatever liberty she might claim as
a betrayed wife. Neither she and her father, nor the Prince and Char-
lotte, immediately act upon their own responsibility. It is as though, for
any workable social resolution to materialize, some process of deferral
must take place so that each party is in a position to rethink his or her
interests and responsibilities for the situation by entertaining a new per-
spective. In order for this process to happen, no one may assume any im-
mediate prerogative to act in self-interest—partly because each character
is checked by fearsome eventualities that seem to loom before any defini-
tive act. The ‘‘instinctive postponements’’ are recognized and mutually
felt between Maggie and the prince: ‘‘What befell, however, was that even
while she [Maggie] thus waited she felt herself present at a process taking
place rather deeper within [Amerigo] than the occasion on the whole,
appeared to require—a process of weighing something in the balance,
of considering, deciding, dismissing’’ (GB, 260).
Maggie does not respond with anything so complete as a plan of
action, and a substantial cast of critics who think otherwise have consis-
tently exaggerated both her power and her forethought. Mark Seltzer,
Jonathan Freedman, Cameron, and Pippin all think that she consciously
succeeds in manipulating and dominating those around her by betraying
no knowledge of her grievance, leaving Charlotte unsure of her standing
61. For an account that suggests that James’s characters in The Golden Bowl affirm multi-
ple, coexisting, and nonexclusive desires and identifications, see Judith Butler, ‘‘Capacity,’’
in Regarding Sedgwick: Essays on Queer Culture and Critical Theory, ed. Stephen M. Barber and
David L. Clark (New York: Routledge, 2002), 109–42.
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and unable to maneuver. Seltzer’s and Freedman’s critiques are built
around a Foucauldian understanding of forms of surveillance in the novel
and power structures that enforce late nineteenth-century family pro-
priety.62 In a sense, they moralize no less than the humanist critics they set
out to defy. I think such readings—though faithful to the end results of
Maggie’s actions—assume an unwarranted degree of knowledge on Mag-
gie’s part from the beginning, ignoring her own conscious sense of vulner-
ability as well as the particular costs she readily incurs in the bargain: she
refuses to be acknowledged as wronged; she rejects any triumphalist rheto-
ric; she ‘‘gives up’’ her father. When Maggie sets out, she does not yet know
what she wants or is willing to live with, but finds her path as she goes
along.
Often James gives us characters who do not simply fail to have precon-
ceived intentions but actively resist having them—or decline to solidify
them by having them confirmed in the eyes of the world. By embracing
the indistinctness of their own and other people’s conduct, James’s pro-
tagonists defend the means of discovering finer and more generous in-
terpretive possibilities for understanding it.63 At least at first, Maggie
finds herself affected by her situation but unable to take definitive steps.
Her initial options for responding to the situation exact an unbearable
price: sacrificing her father’s happiness and potentially risking her own
marriage. She opts instead to proceed by measured inaction. She begins
to adopt a specific ‘‘expression and tone’’—and invites or compels Char-
lotte and the prince to take their cues from her rather than from each
other (GB, 268). She sees that her own conscious sense of herself inter-
ests the prince, and he in turn is given the space to be interested precisely
62. ‘‘The well-policed character of the ‘world’ of The Golden Bowl is at once readily appar-
ent and difficult to assess, apparent in that the novel everywhere displays the nexus of see-
ing, knowing, and exercising power that, I have argued, defines the politics of the Jamesian
text, problematic in that police work and supervision in the novel are so thoroughly inscribed
in gestures of compassion, care, and love’’ (Mark Seltzer, Henry James and the Art of Power
[Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984], 63). Compare Jonathan Freedman: ‘‘Maggie’s
counter-counter-responses range from indirection to outright prevarication, and they are
neatly and cruelly calculated to present Charlotte with a fac¸ade of disingenuous ignorance
and feigned innocence so perfect that it can never be penetrated or parted’’ (Freedman, Pro-
fessions of Taste, 237).
63. I should make clear that James does not grant the exceptional openness that one
observes in, say, Maggie, Charlotte, or Strether, to his ‘‘ficelles’’ and minor characters—
Fanny Assingham or Sarah Pocock. James portrays Fanny fondly, but her overbearing imagi-
nation remains a comically degraded version of that of his principal characters, while
Pocock’s excessively interested perspective and narrow imagination prevent her from achiev-
ing the vital incompleteness that marks James’s more notable personages. For James’s expla-
nation of his use of ‘‘ficelles,’’ see his preface to The Ambassadors, in The Art of the Novel (New
York: Scribner, 1937), 322. His shorter works as well often parody the psychology he delicately
bestows upon the characters of his longer novels.
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because Maggie does not attempt to qualify or define his relationship to
Charlotte on her terms. Suspending her reproaches and potential asper-
sions, Maggie gives the prince breathing room to rethink his perspective.
Her hang-fire manner and air of tentativeness prevent volatile reactions.
This suspension of direct engagement does not diminish Maggie’s
capacity to act; it is an extraordinary augmentation of it. Though a form
of ‘‘obstructed agency’’ and ‘‘impassivity,’’ her stillness does not give rise to
‘‘ugly feelings,’’ such as those Sianne Ngai has explored. Ngai sets out to
study ‘‘ambivalent situations of suspended agency,’’ but her paradigmatic
examples, such as Melville’s ‘‘Bartleby the Scrivener’’ (1853), tend to repre-
sent forms of equivocation that are not positive or liberating.64 James too
offers ‘‘a non-cathartic aesthetic’’ (9) and seems to parade characters before
us who fit Ngai’s description of having ‘‘relatively weak intentionality’’ (22).
That is, they have emotions that ‘‘destabilize our sense of the boundary
between the psyche and the world’’ and superficially at least disclaim auton-
omy (20). And yet they do not necessarily give way to resentment or invari-
ably betray negative emotion, characterized by a diminishment of agency.
For his part, Bergson thinks that the ‘‘zone of indetermination,’’ the
pause or interval of hesitation between perception and action, multiplies
the possibilities for acting.65 The better a body is capable of absorbing
the connections it has to the world, the greater the repertoire of actions
it can muster up.66 He defines this absorbing capacity—which momen-
tarily suspends action—as an affection.67 Gilles Deleuze characterizes Berg-
son’s affections as breaks in the action-reaction circuit.68 Before an action
comes about as an effort directed upon things in the world and meant to
influence them, affection occurs as the body’s ‘‘actual effort upon itself ’’—
effort being the body’s way of adjusting to possibilities, aligning its powers
with them. ‘‘Consciousness means virtual action,’’ says Bergson, and in
James, this consists in extending the influence of individuals over their
situation.69
Even in what most resembles a climactic scene, such as the one where
Fanny Assingham shatters the golden bowl and Maggie braves an en-
64. Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 1.
65. Bergson, Matter and Memory, 32.
66. ‘‘The greater the body’s power of action (symbolized by a higher degree of complex-
ity in the nervous system), the wider is the field that perception embraces’’ (ibid., 56).
67. ‘‘Now we have considered the living body as a kind of center whence is reflected on
the surrounding objects the action which these objects exercise upon it: in that reflection
external perception consists. But this body is not a mathematical point; it is a body, ex-
posed. . . . We might therefore say, metaphorically, that while perception measures the reflect-
ing power of the body, affection measures its power to absorb’’ (ibid.).
68. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara
Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 87.
69. Bergson, Matter and Memory, 57, 50.
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counter with the prince, we get what looks finally like a removal from the
abyss—a bit of backpedaling—rather than any definitive airing of feel-
ings. Maggie considers what difference the possession of real knowledge
of the affair means to her and to Amerigo:
‘‘My only point now, at any rate,’’ she went on, ‘‘is the difference,
as I say, that it may make for you. Your knowing was—from the
moment you did come in [to the room]—all I had in view.’’
And she sounded it again—he should have it once more. ‘‘Your
knowing that I’ve ceased—’’
‘‘That you’ve ceased—?’’ With her pause, in fact, she had fairly
made him press her for it.
‘‘Why, to be as I was. Not to know.’’
It was once more then, after a little, that he had had to stand
receptive. (GB, 366)
This dangling moment, which makes us think just for a second that Mag-
gie will declare that she has ceased to believe in him or to love him, sub-
mits to no such expression of conclusiveness. It circles back; it says again
and draws inward. And yet it betokens a deepening of the receptivity
between the two.
James stakes a great deal on this receptivity. Maggie, at this moment as
throughout, refuses the convenience of outraged feeling. She manages
to grant the prince a definite delay before he must react: ‘‘It had oper-
ated within her now to the last intensity, her glimpse of the precious
truth that by her helping [the prince], helping him to help himself, as it
were, she should help him to help her ’’ (GB, 357). In this statement, her
postponements, which are proffered almost as a gift on her part, also
allow her to fold her own interests into those of the prince and, indeed,
into those of other characters as well. The prince, in turn, reciprocates
by shutting Charlotte out and by accommodating what is ‘‘definite’’ in
her attitude. Maggie strikes an unspoken compact with Charlotte, which
allows the latter to retreat with her husband without paying the price of a
moral exposure. This is a disagreeable but necessary compromise. Char-
lotte gets sacrificed, and Maggie gives her pain a terrible, lucid tribute.
She, in turn, ‘‘gives up’’ her father, one of only two attachments of im-
mense fervor that she possesses.
What comes next, ‘‘foredoomed to remarkable salience,’’ is the avowal of
the significance—the impact and impression—of one person on another
(GB, 462). The prince is awed by the strength of character he has witnessed
in his wife and expresses his wondering esteem to her. Maggie finally brings
an end to any confession on her husband’s part—not through an actual
declaration of guilt from him (the possibility of which would only serve, Mag-
gie is aware, to defame Charlotte at the moment of her supreme sacrifice)—
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but through a profound form of unspoken intimacy. In the dissolution of
an old life—James seems to suggest—a new one, rudimentary in form, may
just ease into perspective. In this, I want to claim that James offers a fully
credible presentation of psychic life, in its suspensions as well as its inevita-
ble limitations and end points, but one structured in ways that demand a
more capacious and nuanced account than is currently offered by our lit-
erary language of character and our most immediate psychological models
of agency.
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